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ABstrAct
Board diversity is important especially in countries which practice a one-tier board system, such as Malaysia. Under 
the system, board appointments are usually controlled by the firm’s substantial shareholders, and as a result, directors 
are chosen based on “the old-boy” network or “people like us”, who are typically middle-aged males and from similar 
ethnicity which could lead to “group think”. Board diversity ensures breadth and depth of the board’s judgments. To 
this end, this study examines board diversity of the top 100 non-financial Malaysian firms, specifically directors’ gender, 
ethnicity and age and their effects on firm performance. Data are collected from the 2007 annual reports of the sample 
firms. The evidence indicates the lack of diversity of the Malaysian boards of directors. Results from the multivariate 
analyses reveal that gender diversity is negatively associated with Tobin’s q and rOA. Age diversity is found to be 
negatively related to rOA. Ethnic diversity, on the other hand, is found to be positively associated with rOA. Hence, 
findings on the effect of board diversity and firm performance are mixed. Nevertheless, this study offers insights to 
policy makers in enhancing corporate governance in Malaysia where diversity is one of the areas that could strengthen 
the effectiveness of the board. 
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ABstrAK
Kepelbagaian dalam lembaga pengarah sesebuah firma adalah penting terutamanya dalam negara yang mengamalkan 
system lembaga pengarah satu peringkat seperti Malaysia. Dalam sistem ini, lantikan ahli lembaga pengarah pada 
lazimnya dikawal oleh pemegang saham utama dan ahli lembaga pengarah dilantik berdasarkan jaringan‘kawan 
lama’ atau ‘orang seperti kita’ yang biasanya adalah lelaki pertengahan umur dan daripada kumpulan etnik yang 
sama yang boleh menjurus kepada ‘fikiran kumpulan’. Kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah boleh menjamin yang sesuatu 
keputusan itu mempunyai ciri kedalaman dan keluasan. Kajian ini meninjau kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah 100 firma 
bukan kewangan terbaik dan kesannya ke atas prestasi firma. Kepelbagaian yang dikaji adalah dari aspek jantina, 
kumpulan etnik dan umur ahli lembaga pengarah. Data diperoleh daripada laporan tahunan 2007 firma yang dikaji. 
Kajian mendapati yang kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah di Malaysia adalah rendah. Keputusan daripada analisis 
multivariate mendapati yang kepelbagaian jantina mempunyai hubungan yang negatif dengan Tobin’s q dan pulangan 
atas aset (rOA). Kepelbagaian umur menunjukkan hubungan yang negatif dengan rOA. sebaliknya, kepelbagaian etnik 
mempunyai hubungan yang positif dengan rOA. Kesimpulannya, kesan kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah ke atas prestasi 
firma adalah bercampur.Walau bagaimanapun, kajian ini memberi maklumat dan pandangan kepada penggubal dasar 
dalam usaha untuk menambah baik tadbir urus korporat di Malaysia, yang mana kepelbagaian adalah salah satu 
bidang yang boleh meningkatkan keberkesanan lembaga pengarah.
Kata kunci: Kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah; pengarah wanita; etnik; kepelbagaian umur; prestasi firma
INtroDUCtIoN
In recent years, the issue of board diversity has received 
much attention because the view that a firm should 
work only in the interests of its shareholders is no 
longer accepted. A firm also has to co-exist with and 
take into account other stakeholders; any action taken 
by a particular stakeholder could affect another, either 
directly or indirectly. Both firms and stakeholders need 
each other to survive and firms explicitly and implicitly 
have contracts with various social constituents which are 
expected to be honored (Freeman 1983, 1984; Donaldson 
& Preston 1995; Jones 1995). 
Given the unitary board structure in Malaysia, 
the board is the highest element of a firm’s internal 
corporate governance system. ACEo usually sits on the 
board together with other directors who are appointed 
by the shareholders. It is always the case that the ‘old 
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boys’ club’ comes into play in board appointments 
or that the appointees are “cut from the same cloth” 
(Grady 1999). this approach contrasts with the two-tier 
board structure, such as that practiced in Germany, the 
Netherland, Japan and Indonesia, in which the board of 
supervisors (Aufsichsrat) appoints the management board 
(Vorstand). No one individual can be a member of both 
boards, which is designed to ensure the independence 
of the supervisors (i.e., the board) from the supervisees 
(i.e., the management). Further, the board of supervisors 
consists of representatives from other stakeholders, in 
addition to the shareholders’ representatives. thus, the 
issue of board diversity is more pressing in countries 
which practice a unitary board structure, where the board’s 
composition is biased towards a particular gender, age or 
ethnicity. It could be argued that Malaysian companies, 
which operate in a markedly multi-ethnic environment, 
need to be more diverse in terms of the ethnic composition 
of boards of directors than those another countries which 
are predominantly populated by one ethnic group, such 
as the UK, the US or Hong Kong. 
the issue of board diversity has also been raised by 
the National Association of Corporate Directors Blue 
ribbon Commission in the US which recommends that 
racial, age and national diversity be considered when 
selecting directors (National Association of Corporate 
Directors 1994). the teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association, College retirement Equities Fund (tIAA-
CrEF), one of the largest financial services companies in 
the US, has adopted a policy statement which requires 
that the board be composed of qualified individuals 
reflecting experience, gender, age and racial diversity 
(tIAA-CrEF 1997).
the first issue to address in order to achieve board 
diversity is that of gender, i.e., the greater participation 
of women at directorial level. Except for Norway and 
Spain, where the appointment of women to boards is 
prescribed by legislation, the number of female directors 
is very low, even in developed countries such as the 
UK and the US. In Malaysia, in 2004, the then Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Badawi, announced a policy which 
stipulated that 30 percent of the decision makers in all 
sectors of the economy should be women. the deadline 
for the 30 percent target to be achieved in the public 
sector was set as 2010. As a continuation of this policy, 
in June 2011, Prime Minister Najib razak announced that 
listed companies had until 2016 to ensure that at least 
30percentof their board members are women. 
the second issue is that of the ethnic composition of 
boards. the ethnicity of the board members in Malaysia is 
perhaps a more contentious issue because, in the aftermath 
of the 1969 racial tensions in Malaysia, the government 
issued the National Economic Policy which, among 
other matters, included the right of the Malays and other 
indigenous groups, on the country’s economy. It was 
stipulated that the Malays and other indigenous groups 
(known collectively as Bumiputras) should control 30 
percent of the country’s wealth. Hence, implicit in this 
policy is that 30 percent of the board members of listed 
firms should be Bumiputras. 
the third type of diversity is that of age diversity. 
In the UK, it is observed that non-executive directors 
are predominantly “white males nearing retirement age 
with previous PLC director experience” (Higgs 2003). 
they are often described as being “male, pale and stale” 
(Garatt 2005) or men who are “cut from the same cloth” 
(Grady 1999). In Malaysia, the situation is expected to 
be worse than in the UK because the pool of qualified 
people is small in comparison to about 1,000 listed firms 
and about 800,000 non-listed SMEs. While the older 
directors are experienced, younger directors are needed 
because they are expected to bring new perspectives to 
the board. According to robinson and Deschant (1997), 
the only way to tap the differences in attitudes, cognitive 
functioning and beliefs is through demographic variables, 
such as ethnicity, age and gender. However, even though 
board diversity is seen as important, it is only relevant if 
it helps to enhance board effectiveness and thus the firm’s 
value; otherwise, board diversity might be regarded as 
‘tokenism’ or be done to comply with societal pressure. 
thus, the objective of this paper is to determine whether 
board diversity as measured by ethnic diversity, gender 
diversity and age diversity is associated with higher firm 
performance among large listed firms in Malaysia. 
the overall findings of this study indicate a low 
degree of diversity with respect to gender, ethnicity 
and age of the directors of the sample firms. Women 
occupied only about 6.6 percent of board seats and 
only 25 percent of the boards are considered ethnically 
diverse. the average age of directors is 58 years with the 
majority of directors falling within the 50-69 age band. 
these findings indicate that there is a lack of diversity in 
Malaysian boards of directors. results from multivariate 
analyses reveal that board diversity is associated with 
firm performance. While ethnic diversity improves 
return on assets (roA), gender diversity is associated 
negatively with both roA and tobin’s q. Age diversity, 
on the other hand, is found to be detrimental to a firm’s 
roA but unrelated to tobin’s q.
the contributions from this paper are as follows. First, 
to our knowledge, this study is the first which addresses 
three issues of board diversity simultaneously, i.e. gender, 
ethnicity and age. Previously, these issues are studied 
separately. Second, this study provides comprehensive 
evidence as to the business case for board diversity in 
Malaysia. third, the findings will also help to improve 
the current policy on board diversity in the Malaysian 
context.  
the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
In the next section, the theoretical development of 
the relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance is presented. this is followed by the 
research methodology section. the findings and 
discussion are presented in the subsequent section and, 
finally, conclusions are drawn.
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WHy BoArD DIVErSIty?
traditionally, a firm’s board is accountable only to its 
shareholders because it is the latter who appoint board 
members. However, that expectation has now changed. 
Nowadays, the board is also accountable to other 
stakeholders (Finance Committee 1999; rose 2004), 
which includes the society at large. thus, while pursuing 
the interest of the shareholders, the directors have to take 
into account the interests of other stakeholders as well. 
In order to achieve this, board membership needs to be 
broadened to better represent the society. Board members 
need to come from diverse backgrounds to enable the 
board to be balanced. Board diversity is expected to 
improve the board’s decision-making because directors 
from various backgrounds having different perspectives 
are involved in the process. theoretically, the association 
between board diversity and firm performance can be 
explained by agency, resource dependence and stakeholder 
theories. Fromagency theory perspective, board diversity 
increases board independence. thus, the more diverse the 
board is, the more independent it is from management. 
this leads to the improvement of the intensity of board 
monitoring. It is argued that this consequently results in 
the alignment of the management’s and the shareholders’ 
interests (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983; 
Mallette & Fowler 1992).
resource dependence theory, on the other hand, sees 
the board as an essential link between the firm and the 
external resources that are essential in maximizing firm 
performance (Pfeffer 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). 
the board is regarded as an important resource for a firm 
because it provides a link with the external environment 
(Hillman et al. 2000; Palmer & Barber 2001). It has been 
argued that the ability of the board to link the firm with 
significant resources is one of the board’s key roles (Zahra 
& Pearce 1989; Korac-Kakabadse et al. 2001). Stakeholder 
theory argues that firms explicitly and implicitly have 
contracts with various social constituents and are 
expected to honor all those contracts (Freeman 1983, 
1984; Donaldson & Preston 1995; Jones 1995). Hence, 
a firm’s shareholders are regarded as one of the many 
stakeholders whom the board needs to consider in their 
decision-making process (Clarkson 1995; Donaldson & 
Preston 1995; Jones 1995; Wood & Jones 1995; Mitchell et 
al. 1997). the adoption of the stakeholder perspective can 
effectively “broaden management’s vision of its roles and 
responsibilities beyond the profit maximization functions 
to include interests and claims of non-stockholding 
groups” (Mitchell et al. 1997: 855). thus, to survive, a 
firm needs to cooperate with its stakeholders (Laan Smith 
et al. 2005). the support and approval from stakeholders 
can be obtained through a dialogue (Laan Smith et al. 
2005) and through the appointment of various stakeholder 
groups to the board. Developing good relations with other 
stakeholders is important because the shareholder value 
depends largely on the support a firm receives from its 
stakeholders, principally employees and members of 
society such as, environmentalists, customers or regulators. 
thus, Jones (1995), adopting transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1975), argues that firms which voluntarily 
pursue socially responsible actions strengthen their 
standing as a desirable transactional partner. Voluntary 
initiatives undertaken by a firm to benefit stakeholders 
not only improve a firm’s image and reputation, but also 
enhance shareholder value. 
In addition to the above theories, a number of 
arguments have been put forward which attempt to 
justify the need for board diversity. the earlier works 
by robinson and Dechant (1997) and Carter, Simkins 
and Simpson (2003) reiterate that board diversity would 
enhance better understanding of the marketplace because 
the board would be made up of individuals of various 
backgrounds. 
GENDEr DIVErSIty
Board diversity ensures that there is a broad base of 
wisdom (Carver 2002) and boards composed of different 
genders, ages and ethnic groups can take advantage of 
the differences to make their firms successful (rutledge 
1998 in Andringa & Engstrom 1998). Compared to other 
attributes of board diversity, gender diversity has received 
a lot of attention, both in the public and research domains 
(Erhardt et al. 2003). It is argued that women have “a 
deep and intimate knowledge of consumer markets and 
customers” (Stephenson 2004). According to Stephenson 
(2004), women in North America control 80 percent of the 
household spending and buy more than 75 percent of all 
products and services. Carter et al. (2003) further state that 
diversity would increase creativity and innovation, which 
in turn would lead to an effective decision making. 
 Based on the findings of earlier studies (e.g., Adler 
2001; Catalyst 2004), Stephenson (2004) discusses the 
reasons why women, in particular, should be on boards. 
First, research evidence shows that boards that have 
more women directors pay more attention to audit and 
risk oversight and control. Second, women directors 
would help companies attract and retain valuable female 
employees as well as promote positive attitudes among 
female employees. third, women directors not only focus 
on financial performance measures, but also place an 
emphasis on non-financial performance measures such as 
innovation and social responsibilities. In addition, Daily 
and Dalton (2003) argue that “Women’s communication 
styles tend to be more participative and process-oriented.” 
Similar to Stephenson (2004), they further state that 
women in the US account for a large percentage of 
consumer purchases because just over half of the US 
population is female. thus, they pose the question: “Who 
better than a female board member to offer insights on the 
female customer?” (Daily & Dalton 2003).
EtHNIC DIVErSIty
In addition to the issue of gender diversity, the ethnicity 
of the directors also reflects board diversity. In Malaysia, 
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the 2007 statistics (Department of Statistics 2007) reveals 
that the population of Malaysia comprises predominantly 
of three main ethnic groups; Malays, Chinese and Indians. 
While the Malays dominate the country’s population 
and politics, the Chinese on the other hand, control the 
economy of Malaysia. the inclusion of various ethnic 
groups in the board is important because every ethnic 
group is culturally different from other ethnic groups. In 
fact, having directors from all of the three main ethnic 
groups can also be beneficial for commercial reasons; i.e. 
a director from a particular ethnic group understands more 
about his or her ethnic group. thus, his or her knowledge 
would be useful in designing the strategies that the firm 
should adopt, for example, to attract customers from his 
or her group. Each ethnic group has its “do’s and don’ts’” 
and the failure to understand the sensitivities of each ethnic 
group could result in the firm being labeled as insensitive 
and this could invariably affect its bottom line. In addition, 
appointing directors from the three main ethnic groups in 
Malaysia will be viewed by the public as ‘good practice’ 
and such a firm will be seen as ethnically conscious.
 Further, having people from different cultures in a 
group leads to high quality, more effective and feasible 
ideas than having people predominantly from the same 
culture in a group (McLeod, Lobel & Cox 1996). Having 
board members from different ethnic backgrounds 
widens the board’s perspectives especially when making 
a decision that touches on issues that are peculiar to a 
particular ethnic group. Further, unique information 
held by diverse directors will improve the quality of 
the information that the board will provide to managers 
(Carter et al. 2010). research studies have suggested that 
directors from a minority group may encourage divergent 
thinking in the board’s decision making process (Westphal 
& Milton 2000). 
AGE
Diversity on the age of directors is another important 
attribute of a board. If the directors of a board are of the 
same age group, the leadership and the decision-making 
styles of the board might be biased towards a particular 
age segment of the market. this is because the directors 
may have similar information and experiences. Appointing 
directors from different age groups will help the board 
to tap information from directors who understand better 
the need and the sensitivity of the stakeholders in their 
age group. the board should reflect society which is, in 
reality, heterogeneous in composition. Interestingly, Carter 
et al. (2003) find that younger boards are more likely to 
include female directors than older boards. Hence, younger 
directors appear to be more open to new approaches 
as opposed to old directors who might be interested in 
maintaining the status quo.
 Higgs (2003) reports that UK non-executive directors 
are notably drawn from a narrow pool. Essentially, directors 
in the UK are predominantly white males who are 60 years 
of age or above. Similar evidence is also documented for 
Australia’s top 100 firms where the majority of directors 
(78.30%) fall within the 51-70 age band and very few 
directors (1.98%) are below 40 years old. thus, there is a 
lack of diversity with respect to ethnicity and age among 
boards of Australian firms (Kang et al. 2007). 
DoES BoArD DIVErSIty MAttEr?
the proportion of female directors in the US, for instance, 
was 4.7 percent in 1987, rose to 13.6 percent in 2003 
(Catalyst 2003) and further improved to 16 percent in 
2006 (Spencer Stuart 2006). A similar pattern has also 
been observed in the UK where the proportion of female 
directors on the boards of UK FtSE 100 companies has 
increased from a mere 3.7 percent in 1995 to 8.6 percent 
in 2003 (Conyon & Mallin 1997; Vinnicombe & Singh 
2003). In Australia, the proportion was found to be 10.4 
percent in 2003 (Kang et al. 2007) and 8.6 percent in 
2004 (Delta outlooks 2004). Although the data for 2004 
indicates that a slightly lower proportion of women 
directors were on boards than in 2003, this does not 
necessarily mean women’s representation on the boards 
of Australian firms declined; rather the difference in the 
finding was likely due to the sampling of companies in 
the studies. While Kang et al. (2007) examines the top 100 
firms in Australia, Delta outlooks uses a sample comprised 
of the top 200 companies in Australia. 
 In Norway, the scenario is considerably different. 
Since 2003, boards of listed firms have been required 
under the law to comprise of at least 40 percent women. By 
December 31, 2007, the proportion of women directors had 
increased to 37 percent (oslo 2007). Smith et al. (2006) 
report that the proportion of women directors in Norway 
had already increased from 6 percent in 2000 to 22 percent 
in 2003. Sweden, a neighboring country of Norway, 
recorded 20 percent female representation on company 
boards of directors in 2003 (Smith et al. 2006). In Finland, 
another Nordic country, women directors accounted for 
26 percent of the board seats in 2008 (Monnery 2008). In 
Spain, the government, through the Equity Law issued in 
2007, recommended that companies fill 40percent of their 
board seats with women by 2015. As a result, in 2008, the 
percentage of companies in Spain with at least one female 
director was 55 percent (an increase from 40% in 2006) 
and the percentage of companies with multiple female 
directors doubled from 8.7 percent in 2006 to 19.2 percent 
in 2008 (Cranfield Female FtSE 100 report 2009).
 In Asia, evidence on women directors is very 
limited. this is because in Asian cultures, women are 
expected to play supporting roles rather than leading 
roles. traditionally, Asian families expect men to be the 
breadwinners while women do the household chores. 
thus, the finding in Japan in 1998 where only 0.2 
percent of the board seats were occupied by women is 
not surprising (Corporate Women Directors International 
2009). the findings further report that women hold only 
17 out of a total of 1,198 board positions (1.4%) of the 
top 100 Japanese companies as at June 30, 2009.
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 In Malaysia, Catalyst (2011) reports that women’s 
representation on boards is 6.8 percent, which is considered 
high compared to Japan but comparable to Australia. A 
higher proportion of women directors, however, is revealed 
in Malaysia by Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009) 
and Shukeri, Shin and Shaari (2012). they respectively 
report that women directors occupied 13.5 percent and 
9.8 percent of the board seats. While Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009) use data for 2000 until 2006 from 
top 100 non-financial firms, Shukeri et al. (2012) employ 
data from 300 randomly selected firms for 2011. the 
differences in the proportion of women directors in these 
three studies could be due to the samples that they used. 
With regard to ethnic diversity, Shukeri et al. (2012) find 
that about 24 percent of board members in Malaysia are 
not from the major races.  Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy 
(2009) reveal that the proportion of non-Malay directors 
on the board is 52 percent. 
It does appear that board diversity is associated with 
firm size, profitability, board size, industry sector (Burke 
1999; Singh et al. 2001; Carter et al. 2003; Brammer et 
al. 2007; Grosvold et al. 2007) and the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board (Conyon & Mallin 1997; 
Brammer et al. 2007). Brammer et al. (2007) conclude that 
a close proximity to the final consumers helps to shape 
board diversity; they find that there is an above average 
presence of women directors in the retail, utilities, media 
and banking sectors. However, they do not find any factors 
that are associated with ethnicity. Carter et al. (2003), on 
the other hand, show that the presence of female directors 
and minorities on the US boards enhances shareholder 
value. In their subsequent study, Carter et al. (2010) do 
not find any evidence linking gender diversity and the 
roA and tobin’s q. Carter et al. (2010) also fail to show 
any association between ethnic diversity and the roA and 
tobin’s q. Keys et al. (2003) also show the benefits of 
promoting diversity, as evidenced by significant average 
cumulative abnormal returns among Fortune “diversity 
elite” firms. orlando (2000) provides evidence that 
racial diversity does affect performance and argues that, 
within the proper context, it could lead to a firm gaining 
competitive advantage. Similarly, Erhardt et al. (2003) 
also show that gender and ethnic diversities are associated 
positively and significantly with a firm’s roA and return on 
investment (roI). Siciliano (1996) and Brown (2002) also 
provide evidence that there is a positive impact of diversity 
on the boards of nonprofit organizations in relation to 
social performance, fundraising and the political aspects 
of board performance. 
 Nevertheless, diversity has been found to lead to 
a lower consensus because more time and effort are 
required; thus, this leads to a lower group performance 
(Knight et al. 1999). In fact, Shrader et al. (1997) show a 
negative association between female directors on boards 
in the US and two accounting measures (roA and return 
on equity (roE) of 200 Fortune 500 firms. Zahra and 
Stanton (1988) also offer similar evidence among Fortune 
500 companies. rose (2007), who examines the role of 
women on the boards of Danish firms, finds that the effect 
of women directors on firm performance is insignificant, 
i.e., there is no association between women directors 
and firm performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) also 
find that, on average, diversity affects firm performance 
negatively.
 In the Malaysian context,  Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009) and Shukeri et al. (2012) document 
that gender diversity is not associated with firm 
performance, measured by roE and roA. However, 
while Shukeri et al. (2012) show that ethnic diversity 
is associated positively with roE, Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009) do not find such evidence.
 In sum, evidence, which is primarily from developed 
countries, on the relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance is mixed, i.e. the positive link between 
women directors and firm performance is not conclusive. 
research in this area seems to indicate that there can be no 
association, negative or positive, between women directors 
and a firm’s financial performance. While Carter et al. 
(2010) contend that the mixed findings could be due to 
different circumstances at different times, the pattern could 
be due to the fact that women’s representation on boards is 
still very low. Since the majority of firms that have women 
on their boards have only one woman director, it does 
appear that, in the boardroom, it is like one woman against 
the rest of the board members. However, in the Malaysian 
context, the importance of board diversity is clearly stated 
in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. the 
Government’s initiatives in recent years also underscore 
the importance of board diversity of the Malaysian boards. 
Hence, based on the initiatives taken in Malaysia and the 
theoretical perspectives discussed above, and the argument 
that diversity would enhance board effectiveness and firm 
value, we hypothesize the following:
H1 Gender diversity is associated positively with firm 
performance.
H2 Ethnic diversity is associated positively with firm 
performance.
H3 Age diversity is associated positively with firm 
performance.
MEtHoDoLoGy
A total of 100 non-financial firms listed on the Malaysian 
stock exchange, the Bursa Malaysia, were included in the 
sample, based on market capitalization. this approach 
is similar to the approach taken in earlier studies (e.g. 
Conyon & Mallin 1997; Singh et al. 2001; Grosvold et 
al. 2007; Kang et al. 2007) which focus on the leading 
companies in their respective countries. the relevant data 
were hand collected from the sample firms’2007 annual 
reports, which were accessed via the Bursa Malaysia 
website. the year 2007 was chosen because it was prior to 
the 2008 global financial crisis. It was also chosen because 
it was about three years after the policy of attaining 30 
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percent women participation at decision-making levels 
was introduced by the Malaysian government. Hence, it 
is expected that Malaysian firms would by this time have 
understood the spirit of the policy and would be complying 
with it more readily.
 Board diversity is measured in three ways. First, it is 
measured by the presence of women on the board (labeled 
as ‘Gender’). Second, board diversity is measured by 
the presence of the three main ethnic groups in Malaysia 
on the board (which is labeled as ‘Ethnicity’). the main 
ethnic groups in Malaysia are Malays, Chinese and 
Indians. this is a dummy variable, where, if a board is 
comprised of all three main ethnic groups, a value of 
“1” is given and “0” if otherwise. third, board diversity 
is measured by “age diversity”. the average age of the 
directors of each board was first determined. Proponents 
of the need for age diversity stress that the board should 
not be primarily composed of those who are almost at 
retirement age. For example, the Higgs report (2003) 
describes the directors in UK public listed companies as 
being those who are nearing retirement and labels them 
as “stale”. In this study, nearing retirement age is defined 
as being 60 and above. thus, if the average age of the 
board is 60 and above, the board is considered as “stale” 
and given a value of “0”, whereas, if the average age of 
the board is below 60, it is considered as “non-stale’ and 
given a value of “1”.
 Firm performance is measured using tobin’s q, 
which is the sum of the market value of equity and book 
value of total debts divided by the book value of total 
assets. the roA is another measure of performance, 
which is computed by dividing profit before interest 
and taxes by the firm’s total assets. these two measures 
have been extensively used in prior research studies that 
investigate the association between board diversity and 
firm performance (e.g. Shrader et al. 1997; Erhardt et al. 
2003; rose 2007; Adams & Ferreira 2009). In fact, these 
measures, especially the roA, are often used by financial 
analysts and market when assessing a firm’s performance 
(Erhardt et al. 2003).
Board independence and board size are included in 
this model as the control variables. Board independence 
is measured as the proportion of independent directors to 
the total number of board members. Firm size is measured 
by the natural log of total assets. the multiple regression 
analysis is used to test the hypotheses:
FPerfi = α + β1Genderi + β2Ethnicityi + β3Agei + + β4Bindi 
+ β5LnAssetsi + ε
where:
Fperfi = performance of firm i, either tobin’s q or roA,
Gender = gender diversity, a dummy variable; “1” if 
at least one female director on the board, and “0” 
otherwise,
Ethnicity = ethnic diversity, a dummy variable; “1” if all 
three main ethnic groups are represented on the board, 
and “0” otherwise,
Age = age diversity, a dummy variable; “1” if the average 
age of the board of directors less than 60 years, and 
“0” otherwise,
Bind = board independence, measured as the proportion 
of independent directors to the board size, 
Ln Assets = size of a firm measured by the natural log of 
total assets, and
ε = error term.
FINDINGS
A total of 851 board seats are available in all the top 100 
non-financial firms for the 2007 financial year, indicating 
that, on average, the boards of large Malaysian firms 
consist of 8.5 directors. out of the 851 board seats, only 
54 seats are occupied by women, representing only 6.3 
percent of the total board seats, which is lower than that 
reported by Marimuthu and Kolandaisamay (2009) and 
Shukeri et al. (2012). However, our evidence is consistent 
with Catalyst (2011). overall, a total of 39 firms (39%) 
have at least one female director on their boards. this 
is far behind the UK, where, in 2005, 78 percent of UK 
boards have at least one female director (Grosvold et al. 
2007). out of these 39 large firms, only 12 percent have 
more than one female director. this evidence is generally 
consistent with that found in Australia (13.5%) (Equal 
opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency 2006), 
but is behind those in the Europe (28% as reported by 
European Professional Women’s Network (2004)) and 
the US (25% as reported by Adams & Ferreira (2009)). 
out of the 54 board seats occupied by female directors; 
16 are executive directors, 24 are non-executive, non-
independent directors, and 14 are independent directors. 
Further, only a total of 39 women occupied these 54 board 
seats; 27 women hold only one directorship, 10 hold 
two directorships, 1 holds three and another holds four 
directorships. At a rate of 6.3 percent, the representation 
of women on the boards of large Malaysian firms is about 
one-third of the rate of women directors on the boards 
of the US firms and about half of the rate of women 
directors on the boards of the UK and Australian firms 
(Vinnicombe & Singh 2003; Kang et al. 2007; Spencer 
Stuart 2007). the rate in large Malaysian firms is, 
nevertheless encouraging because it is much higher than 
that in Japan where women only occupy 0.2 percent of the 
board seats (Corporate Women Directors International 
2009). on average, in Malaysia, there is 0.54 women 
representation on the board or approximately one women 
director for every two boards, which is similar to the 
findings by Brammer et al. (2007), in which the average 
female representation on the UK boards is 0.5 with an 
average board size of 8.8. table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the sample firms.
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 With respect to ethnic diversity, we found that the 
“Malays and other indigenous” group occupy 391 board 
seats (i.e. 46 percent); the “Chinese” group occupies 
358 board seats (42%), while the “Indian” group sit on 
33 board seats (4%). the boards are dominated by the 
Malays/indigenous and the Chinese. on average, the 
Malays/indigenous occupy about 46 percent (3.91/8.51) 
of the board membership and the Chinese, who occupy 
42 percent (3.58/8.51) of the board seats. table 2 presents 
the ethnic diversity and age diversity for the sample 
firms.
tABLE 2. Ethnic and age diversity
Panel A. Ethnic diversity  Frequency (%) 
Presence of Malays yes 97 
 No 3 
Presence of Chinese yes 93 
 No 7 
Presence of Indians yes 28 
 No 72 
one ethnic group  4 
one ethnic group with foreigner  2 
two ethnic groups  46 
two ethnic groups with foreigner  23 
three ethnic groups  17 
three ethnic groups with foreigner  8 
Panel B. Age diversity  
Below 40  0 
40 to 49  2 
50 to 59  75 
60 to 69  23 
70 and above  0
the Malays and other indigenous group and the 
Chinese group sit on almost all the boards, as shown 
in Panel A of table 2. the majority of the boards have 
directors from these two main ethnic groups (i.e. 68%) 
and only 4 percent of the firms have appointed members 
of only one ethnic group to their boards. only 25 firms 
(25%) have directors from all three of the main ethnic 
groups, which is consistent with Shukeri et al. (2012). the 
remaining 75 firms (75%) of the firms appoint directors 
from only one or two of the three main ethnic groups. the 
Indians sit on only 28 boards.
With respect to age diversity, three quarters of the 
boards have an average age that falls within the 50-59 age 
band, as shown in Panel B of table 2. About one quarter 
falls within the 60-69 age band. this finding is consistent 
with the evidence found on Australian boards (Kang et al. 
2007). A closer look at the data reveals that 52 percent of 
the firms in Malaysia have directors with an average age 
of between 55 to 60 years old. this mirrors the typical 
age of UK directors, who they are middle aged (Higgs 
report 2003). operationalizing age diversity into ‘stale’ or 
‘non-stale’, 22 percent of the firms have directors whose 
average age is more than 60 years of age (i.e. ‘stale’), 
while the remaining 78 percent of the directors are less 
than 60 years of age (i.e. ‘non-stale’). table 3 shows the 
results on board diversity according to industry sectors, 
as classified by the Bursa Malaysia. 
As discussed above, 39 of the firms have women 
representatives on their boards. Among these 39 firms, 
16 (i.e. 41percent) are trading/services companies. 
However, in terms of the presence of female directors 
on the board, firms in the property sector appear to be 
the most supportive of gender equality; 70 percent of the 
firms in this sector appoint at least one female director 
to their boards. In fact, in terms of the proportion of 
women directors, the property sector also has the highest 
proportion of women on the board, that is 12 percent. 
this is followed by the trading/ services sector, where 
the average proportion of women on the board is 7 
percent. the findings are quite consistent with those 
by Brammer et al. (2007) for the UK, where the retail 
sector has a higher rate of women directors than other 
sectors. Firms in the retail and trading/services sector are 
more likely to appoint women directors because these 
firms are more likely to be dominated by women. on 
the other hand, plantation and consumer products firms 
in Malaysia appear to be less willing to appoint female 
directors. Being a male-dominated industry, the boards 
of the plantation firms are more likely to appoint men 
rather than women. 
tABLE 1. Descriptive statistics for sample firms
Variable Min Max Mean Std.
      Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis
 
tobin’s q 0.33 27.23 1.898 2.907 7.046 59.21 
roA -0.04 1.42 0.11 0.16 5.76 42.15 
Average age of directors 49.37 68.33 57.74 4.02 0.42 0.26 
Female directors 0 4 0.54 0.797 1.64 3.08 
Proportion of female directors 0 0.40 0.06 0.09 1.64 2.62 
Malay/indigenous directors 0 10 3.91 2.45 0.28 -0.98 
Chinese directors 0 10 3.58 2.55 0.19 -1.13 
Indian directors 0 3 0.33 0.59   
total assets (rM million) 216 67,000 6,549 10,442 3.29 13.06 
Board independence 0.22 0.71 0.42 0.10 0.54 -0.10
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With respect to age diversity, the directors in the 
plantation and consumer products sectors seem to be 
older compared to the directors in other sectors. Perhaps 
this is due to the fact that these sectors have been in 
existence much longer than the other sectors. In terms of 
ethnic diversity, the construction and consumer products 
sectors seem to be more prepared to engage directors 
from the three main ethnic groups compared to firms in 
other sectors. table 4 presents the results from Pearson 
correlation analyses. 
the association between gender diversity and firm 
performance is negative, suggesting that firms with women 
on the board tend to perform poorly. Hence, taking all the 
evidence together, board diversity in gender, ethnicity 
and age have mixed consequences on firm performance. 
Both the market and accounting performance appear to 
either react negatively or being indifferent. However, all 
in all, diversity appears to be counter-productive to firm 
performance. this evidence is thus far consistent with the 
study in the US by Shrader et al. (1997) and Zahra and 
Stanton (1988) and rose (2007) in Denmark.
table 5 presents the results from the multiple 
regression analyses. Panel A of table 5 shows the results 
when female representation is treated as a dummy variable. 
Panel B, on the other hand, presents the results when 
female representation is treated as a continuous variable, 
measured as the proportion of females on the board. to 
reduce the problem of non-normality of tobin’s q and 
roA, these variables were normalized using the Van der 
Waerden procedure available in SPSS.
tABLE 3. Diversity and sectors (n = 100)
Sector Gender diversity Age diversity Ethnic diversity
 Proportion yes No yes No yes No
 to board size
Consumer product 0.03 3 10 8 5 4 9
(n = 13)  (17%) (83%) (61%) (39%) (31%) (69%)
Industrial product 0.06 5 9 12 2 3 11
(n = 14)  (36%) (64%) (86%) (14%) (21%) (79%)
Construction 0.04 3 6 9 0 3 6
(n = 9)  (33%) (67%) (100%) (0%) (33%) (67%)
trading/services 0.07 16 20 29 7 10 26
(n = 36)  (44%) (56%) (81%) (19%) (28%) (72%)
Infrastructure 0.06 2 2 4 0 1 3
(n = 4)  (50%) (50%) (100%) (0%) (25%) (75%)
Properties 0.12 7 3 7 3 2 8
(n = 10)  (70%) (30%) (70%) (30%) (20%) (80%)
Plantation 0.04 3 10 8 5 1 12
(n = 13)  (23%) (77%) (62%) (38%) (8%) (92%)
technology 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
(n = 1)  (0%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (100%)
total 0.06 39 61 78 22 24 76
  (39%) (61%) (78%) (22%) (24%) (76%)
tABLE 4. Correlation analyses 
Variable tobin’s q§ roA§ Gender Age Ethnicity BInd 
tobin’s q§ 1.000      
roA§ 0.566*** 1.000     
Gender -0.247** -0.205** 1.000    
Age -0.087 -0.187* 0.039 1.000   
Ethnicity -0.025 0.056 0.094 0.139 1.000  
Bind 0.038 -0.054 0.016 -0.080 0.151 1.000 
LnAssets -0.464*** -0.348*** 0.183* -0.018 0.200** 0.050
Notes: *significant at 10 percent (2-tailed); **significant at five percent (2-tailed); ***significant at one percent (2-tailed). N = 100.
§tobin’s q and roA were normalized using the Van der Waerden procedure.
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 the results in Panel A and Panel B of table 5 are 
qualitatively similar. When tobin’s q is used as the measure 
for firm performance, only gender diversity is found to be 
significant and the direction is negative. However, when 
roA is used as the measure for firm performance, gender, 
age and ethnic diversities are significant; nevertheless, 
only the direction between ethnic diversity and roA 
is positive. It is also found that gender diversity is 
consistently negatively associated with firm performance, 
be it tobin’s q or roA. these findings are consistent 
with that of Darmadi (2012) on top female executives in 
Indonesia but inconsistent with those of Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009) and Shukeri et al. (2001). Both 
of the latter studies find no association between gender 
diversity and firm performance in Malaysia. thus, the 
representation of women on the board results in lower 
performance, a finding consistent with studies carried out 
in the US and other developed countries (Zahra & Stanton 
1988; Shrader et al. 1997; Adams & Ferreira 2009). 
However, the evidence is inconsistent with the evidence 
in some other studies of the situation in the US (Carter 
et al. 2003, 2010; Erhardt et al. 2003; Keys et al. 2003). 
Mixed results are documented for ethnic and age diversity. 
While the market performance is unaffected by ethnic and 
gender diversity, the accounting-based performance does 
increase, which is consistent with Shukeri et al. (2012). 
However, the evidence is not consistent with Carter et al. 
(2010) who find that minorities on the board is neither 
associated with the roA nor tobin’s q. As for age diversity, 
the market appears to be indifferent as to the issue of age 
diversity. However, the accounting return suffers if the 
directors of the board tend to be young. In other words, 
the accounting performance of a firm is better if its board 
is dominated by old directors.
the findings of this study could be interpreted to 
mean that the appointment of women to the board does not 
lead to better firm performance because their appointment 
could be due to tokenism or lack of a critical mass (Kramer, 
Konrad & Erkut 2008). In fact, in table 4, it is found 
that the appointment of women to the board is associated 
positively with firm size. Hence, the larger a firm is, the 
more likely it is to appoint women to the board. Perhaps 
appointing women to the board is seen as an avenue 
through which to discharge the firm’s social responsibility, 
which goes beyond the need to maximize shareholder 
value because it involves the ethical treatment of the 
firm’s stakeholders (Keasey et al. 1997). As suggested 
by Adams and Ferreira (2009), appointing women to the 
board could result in over-monitoring. they found that 
over-monitoring by the board reduces the speed of the 
tABLE 5. results from multiple regression analyses
Panel A. Female representation as dummy variable
Variable  tobin’s q§   roA§ 
 coeff. std. error VIF coeff. std. error VIF
Constant 7.768*** 1.586  6.751*** 1.631  
Gender -0.323** 0.179 1.048 -0.299* 0.185 1.048 
Age -0.233 0.209 1.033 -0.514** 0.216 1.033 
Ethnicity 0.205 0.206 1.097 0.415** 0.213 1.097 
Board independence 0.311 0.861 1.037 -0.829 0.888 1.037 
Ln Assets -0.351*** 0.071 1.079 -0.275*** 0.073 1.079 
Adjusted r square 0.220   0.17   
F-statistics 6.576***   5.051***
  
*significant at 10 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level;***significant at 1 percent level.
§ tobin’s q and roA were normalized using the Van der Waerden procedure.
Panel B.  Female representation as a continuous variable
Variable  tobin’s q§   roA§ 
 coeff. std. error VIF coeff. std. error VIF 
Constant 7.833*** 1.561  6.885*** 1.621  
Gender -1.966** 0.907 1.048 -1.704** 0.946 1.027 
Age -0.202 0.208 1.039 -0.490** 0.216 1.039 
Ethnicity 0.134 0.205 1.101 0.354** 0.212 1.101 
Board independence 0.634 0.858 1.050 -0.557 0.891 1.050 
Ln Assets -0.362*** 0.069 1.050 -0.286*** 0.072 1.050 
Adjusted r square 0.236   0.175   
F-statistics 7.101***   5.203***  
*significant at 10 percent level;**significant at 5 percent level;***significant at 1 percent level.
§ tobin’s q and roA were normalized using the Van der Waerden procedure.
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board’s decision making, which, in turn, leads to a lower 
performance.
 this study finds that age diversity is negatively 
associated with the roA, which means that the older the 
average age of the board members, the better it is the 
performance of the firm with respect to the accounting 
returns. Further tests were carried out on both the roA 
and tobin’s q by using the average age of directors as a 
continuous variable rather than a dummy variable. the 
findings are qualitatively similar to the findings in table 
5. thus, as the results indicate, it is better for firms to 
appoint older individuals to the board rather than younger 
individuals. older directors are more experienced and 
their experience appears to be useful in guiding their 
firms, especially during the 2008 global financial crisis. 
However, it could also be argued that older directors might 
be more conservative in choosing the firm’s strategies. 
Hence, due to the shorter service horizon, they might 
tend to prefer business activities that yield current year’s 
profits to business projects that yield future profits. the 
younger directors who are perhaps more dynamic and 
forward looking might be more willing to take risks and 
more prepared to defer current year profits to the future. 
Interestingly, the market-based performance measure is 
not affected by the age of directors of the board. thus, 
the market appears to be indifferent to the age diversity 
of the board. 
 Ethnic diversity is also found to be positively and 
significantly related to the roA. Hence, boards which 
consist of directors from the three main ethnic groups 
perform better in the accounting-based performance 
measure than firms which comprise of directors 
predominantly from one or two ethnic groups. this result 
is generally consistent with the evidence in the US. For 
instance, Carter et al. (2003) and Erhardt et al. (2003) find 
that the presence of minorities on the board positively 
influences firm performance. 
Board independence is not related to the performance 
measures. this finding confirms the earlier findings for 
Malaysia by Abdullah (2004; 2006) and the results of 
the present study add to the existing mixed findings on 
this issue (e.g., Dalton et al. 1998; Wagner et al. 1998; 
rhoades et al. 2000; Heracleous 2001; Bhagat & Black 
2002; McCabe & Nowak 2008). Firm size, on the other 
hand, is negatively associated with both performance 
measures. In the US, Carter et al. (2003) and Erhardt et 
al. (2003) find an insignificant association between firm 
size and tobin’s q in their studies on board diversity. 
the findings presented here indicate that smaller firms, 
as measured by total assets, perform better than larger 
firms. one explanation is that smaller firms have, perhaps, 
concentrated on the ‘niche’ market segments as opposed 
to larger firms which serve a wider market. thus the 
smaller firms are able to make more profits because of 
less competition. As opposed to large firms, these smaller 
firms may have been more able to absorb the crisis which 
started in late 2007 which originated in the US because 
their markets are largely domestic.
 Additional analyses were carried out to look 
into further issues involving tokenism, ethnicity, age 
dispersion and the effect of industry sector. In Model 1, 
gender diversity is recoded so that a board having two 
or more women directors is given a value of ‘1’, and ‘0’ 
otherwise. this is because having only one woman on the 
board is considered evidence of tokenism (Bourez 2005; 
Branson 2006; Adams & Ferreira 2009). Second, the 
ethnic diversity variable is changed into an ordinal type 
to capture the effect of ethnicity better. For this variable, 
the board with only one ethnic group is given a value of 
‘1’. A board that has two ethnic groups is given a value 
of ‘2’. A value of ‘3’ is given to boards which consist 
of all three main ethnic groups. Further, age diversity is 
reclassified according to age bands where a value of “1” 
is given to board members who are less than 40 years 
old, a value of ‘2’ to those who are 40-50 years old, a 
value of ‘3’ to those who are 51-60 years old and a value 
of ‘4’ to those who are above 60 years old and above. 
In Model 2, the effect of industry on the association 
between gender and performance is examined. In 
particular, the trading and consumer products sectors are 
scrutinized. these two sectors were focused on because 
of women’s proximity to consumers and their intimate 
knowledge of consumer markets and consumers, as 
suggested by Stephenson (2004). to this end, dummy 
variables are used to determine the effect of industry, i.e. 
trading and consumer products. For the trading sector 
variable, a value of ‘1’ is given if a firm is classified in 
the trading sector, and ‘0’ otherwise. For the consumer 
sector variable, a value of ‘1’ is given if a firm is in the 
consumer sector, and ‘0’ otherwise.  
tABLE 6. Additional multiple regression analyses 
Variable tobin’s q roA 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
  (coeff.) (coeff.) (coeff.) (coeff.)
Constant 8.193*** 7.669*** 6.877*** 6.794*** 
Gender 0.026 -3.458*** -0.311 -2.845** 
Gender x - 3.496* - 2.630 
 trading 
Gender x - -6.644** - -2.417
 Consumer
Age -0.242 -0.237 -0.485 -0.515 
Ethnicity 0.181 0.030 0.347* 0.291 
Board 0.396 0.602 -0.784 -0.544 
 independence
Ln Assets -0.375*** -0.348*** -0.285*** -0.280*** 
Adjusted r 0.193 0.311 0.158 0.191
 square 
F-statistics 5.728*** 7.382*** 4.703*** 4.333***
*significant at 10 percent level;**significant at 5 percent level;***significant at 1 
percent level.
§ tobin’s q and roA were normalized using the Van der Waerden procedure.
 the results in table 6 indicate that the relationship 
between female directorships and roA remains negative. 
In fact, the negative association is stronger than it is 
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in table 5. thus, even when there are more women 
on the board, they appear to adversely affect the 
firm’s accounting-based performance. However, the 
association becomes insignificant when the market-based 
performance measure is used. thus, when a firm appoints 
more women to the board the market views this positively 
because the relation changes from negative to zero. Age 
dispersion does not have any impact on performance, be 
it roA or tobin’s q. Hence, the results in tables 5 and 6 
suggest that older directors, who are considered ‘stale’, 
are better because the accounting-based performance is 
better. Finally, mixed findings are revealed with respect 
to industry type. While industry type does not seem 
to have any interaction with female directors on roA, 
different results are found for tobin’s q. For the trading 
sector, the presence of women on the board has a positive 
impact on tobin’s q; but a negative influence is recorded 
for women directors in the consumer sector. thus, the 
appointment of women in the consumer sector is viewed 
negatively by the market. Perhaps this is because the 
market dislikes the over-monitoring approach taken 
by women directors which could result in delays in the 
introduction of new products in response to fast-changing 
consumer tastes.
CoNCLUSIoN
Board diversity has been the subject of debate for some 
time and it has been argued that it can enhance board 
effectiveness because it increases board independence and 
board decision-making perspectives. the focus of research 
has been on gender, ethnic and age diversities in boards. 
Among these three issues, gender diversity has been 
extensively researched and the subject of political attention 
in some countries. For instance, in Norway, the proportion 
of female appointments to boards was enshrined in law in 
2003. In 2004, the Malaysian government adopted a policy 
to appoint at least 30 percent of women to decision-making 
levels in the public and private sectors. Subsequently, in 
2011, the Prime Minister expanded the scope of this policy 
to require listed firms to have at least 30 percent female 
representation on their boards by 2016. 
the findings of this study show that gender, ethnic 
and age diversities among Malaysian firms are still very 
low. only about 6 percent of the available board seats are 
occupied by women and only 39 percent of the boards 
have women on them. In terms of ethnic diversity, only 25 
percent of the firms are considered ethnically diverse with 
representatives from all three main ethnic groups. Clearly, 
the boards of large Malaysian firms are predominantly 
occupied by Malay and Chinese males. As for age 
diversity, the average age of the directors is 58 years old. 
More than half of the sample firms have an average board 
age of 50 to 59 years. taking all these board patterns into 
account, the boards of large Malaysian firms lack diversity. 
they are similar to UK boards whose directors are nearing 
retirement and are predominantly white males.
However, our findings generally indicate that 
the appointment of women to the board does not 
result in higher firm financial performance; rather, 
their appointment to the board leads to a lower firm 
financial performance. When we looked at the issue of 
tokenism in our analysis, by focusing on firms with two 
or more women directors on the board, we found that 
the detrimental effects of women on the board persist. 
However, our further analyses do indicate that market-
based performance improves with the appointment of 
women on the board of firms in the trading and services 
sector. one possible reason for this finding is that women, 
who are generally more caring, might, as directors, 
be more inclined toward improving a firm’s social 
as opposed to its financial performance. Perhaps the 
appointment of women to the boards might be driven by 
the need to support the policy adopted by the Malaysian 
government in 2004 which requires 30 percent women 
participation at the decision-making level across all 
sectors. As more women are appointed to hold key posts 
in the public sector, the private sector is responding by 
appointing more women to their boards. 
Ethnic diversity does have a positive impact on 
accounting-based performance measure. Boards which 
comprise of representatives from all of the three main 
ethnic groups perform better compared to boards which 
are predominantly comprised of one or two ethnic groups. 
Hence, appointing directors from the three main ethnic 
groups is helpful in improving firm performance. Perhaps 
having directors from various ethnic backgrounds helps 
the boards to understand customers’ needs better. 
the effect of age diversity on firm performance 
is insignificant. While it is found that it is negatively 
associated with the accounting-based performance 
measure, it is not associated with the market-based 
measure. While older directors are associated with higher 
accounting-based performance, the market seems to be 
indifferent to the age of the directors. Perhaps the older 
directors provide wisdom and counsel to the executive 
directors as opposed to the younger directors who might 
be dynamic and rich with ideas but might lack experience. 
In addition, the more experienced, ‘entrenched’ directors 
provide the connection between the firm and the 
government. these entrenched directors are generally 
well known both in business and government circles. 
In conclusion, despite the fact that Malaysia is a 
developing country, the appointment of women to the 
board does not lag far behind that in developed countries. 
Although the appointment of women to the board is 
not yet widely practiced in Malaysia, there has been 
significant progress. It may well be that the impact of 
female appointments on firms’ performance is negative 
because the existence and participation of women on 
the board is still in its infancy. the boards in Malaysia 
are still very much ‘men’s clubs’ and thus breaking their 
dominance is not an easy task. In fact, in board meetings, 
there may be just one woman director, outnumbered by 
around eight to ten male directors on the board. Similarly, 
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ethnic diversity in the boards should be pursued because 
it leads to positive results for firms. the boards of 
Malaysian firms should reflect the composition of the 
Malaysian population. Each ethnic group is different in 
social, cultural and economic terms. Greater diversity 
could minimize the risk of ‘group think’ or of making 
decisions which are biased toward particular groups of 
the stakeholders. Moreover, embracing gender and ethnic 
diversity is not only a ‘good practice’, but it can also be 
an effective business strategy. 
In light of the findings, there are a few implications 
for academic and practitioners. For academic, the issue 
of board diversity, especially gender diversity remains 
unsettled as the findings are not as the theories had 
expected. Perhaps, gender and ethnic diversity is best 
measured by non-financial performance rather than 
financial performance. Undoubtedly, board diversity 
adds value to the firm; but the value may not be reflected 
in the monetary term. Perhaps, the need for women and 
minority directors is situational, i.e. contingent on the 
circumstances faced by a firm. Hence, one size may not 
fit all. thus, future research on board diversity should 
focus more on these issues rather than on the business 
case for diversity. For practitioners, the implications are 
as follow. First, board diversity, while it is important, 
requires time to be fully effective. What is more 
important is the readiness of the firms to embrace the 
culture of ‘inclusiveness’ in their boardrooms rather than 
the culture of compliance. Even though the Government 
has come up with a policy on women appointment to the 
board, but it is the firms themselves which need to reap 
the benefits from having women on the board. Second, 
women need to equip themselves and be ready to assume 
the directors’ roles. the women who are already holding 
the top posts need to promote those women who are 
currently in the middle level to be ready for top posts. 
third, ethnic diversity should be encouraged because 
the stakeholders, and more importantly the consumers, 
are from various ethnic groups. Finally, including a few 
young directors on the board is vital because this should 
be part of the firm’s succession plan.
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